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INTRODUCTION
In International Ass'n of Firefighters Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson,' the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Ms. Mendez-Thompson,
the wife of a city firefighter, had standing to challenge a provision of
the Ferguson, Missouri, city charter that prohibited city employees
from directly or indirectly engaging in certain political activities. In
doing so, the Eighth Circuit reversed the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.3 The Eighth
Circuit held that Mendez-Thompson had standing for two reasons:
(1) she was directly injured by having her First Amendment freedom
of speech rights chilled as a result of fears that the city would fire her
husband if she participated in political activities; and (2) she sus-
tained a threat of indirect economic injury because her husband's
ability to provide economic support would be reduced if he were
fired .4
In holding that Mendez-Thompson had standing, the Eighth Cir-
cuit created a split between it and three other circuit courts. The
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits had previously held that the
spouse of a public employee did not have separate standing to chal-
lenge similar provisions under different standards than those
J.D. Candidate, 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1998, Dickinson Col-
lege. I would like to thank Professor Catherine Struve for her valuable assistance.
1 283 F.3d 969 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Firefighters 1"), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
2 See Firefighters II, 283 F.3d at 971 (citing Ferguson, Mo. Charter § 5.3). The city charter
states:
Neither the city manager nor any person holding an administrative office or position
under the city manager's supervision shall be a candidate for mayor or city council
member or engage, directly or indirectly, in sponsoring, electioneering or contributing
money or other things of value for any person who is a candidate for mayor or coun-
cil .... Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be removed in the man-
ner provided in the personnel code.
Id. (emphasis added).
5 Id. at 976.
4 Id. at 973-74 ("[P]laintiff has an interest of her own to defend. Not only is it her own po-
litical activities that she seeks to protect, but her own personal and economic status as well.").
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governing the public employees.5 The Eighth Circuit recognized
these other decisions but decided to disagree for a number of reasons
discussed further below, and granted Mendez-Thompson standing to
challenge the Ferguson ordinance.6 The Supreme Court denied cer-
tiorari in 2003,' leaving this circuit split to be resolved by another
case. Because the rights at stake are so important, the Court should
take a similar case soon to resolve the split. This Comment illustrates
the argument that plaintiffs such as Mendez-Thompson could and
should be granted standing when the Supreme Court decides to re-
solves the circuit split.
This Comment will discuss why the Eighth Circuit was correct to
grant Mendez-Thompson standing. Mendez-Thompson could suffer
from an imminent, concrete economic injury due to the loss of her
husband's income. She was also suffering from a chill of her First
Amendment freedom of speech rights due to the "indirect" language
in the Ferguson ordinance. Denying separate standing under more
favorable legal standards than those under which the government
employee's claims are examined could have broad ramifications for
the families of all public employees in terms of their First Amend-
ment free speech rights. Courts should conduct a searching inquiry
into a claim that rests on the free speech rights granted to all citizens
by the U.S. Constitution before denying a plaintiff a day in court to
challenge an ordinance prohibiting direct or indirect political speech
by a public employee.
Section I of this Comment will discuss the circuit split between the
Eighth Circuit and the Ninth, Tenth, and Fourth Circuits, and ex-
plain why the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the holdings of the other
circuits in similar circumstances. It will also discuss the minimal pro-
tections provided for public employee speech under the First Amend-
ment. While the United States Supreme Court has allowed
restrictions on the free speech of public employees, the Ferguson or-
dinance applies to persons who are not public employees and there-
fore should be analyzed under different standards than those used in
5 See Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that relatives
whose claims are derivative in nature do not have standing when the main claimant does not
have a valid claim); Horstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that the spouse of a city employee has standing only to raise the same claims as the city em-
ployee derivatively); English v. Powell, 592 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that a wife's inju-
ries were too indirect and speculative to support her claim of standing in a lawsuit filed to
challenge the propriety of her husband's demotion).
6 Firefighters II, 283 F.3d at 975 ("We express our disagreement with these cases .... The
injury may be indirect, in that it occurs initially to the husband, through loss of his job. It is
nonetheless real and tangible.").
7537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
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public employee cases. Standing was correctly granted to Mendez-
Thompson so that a more favorable standard could be established.
Section II will discuss the standing doctrine. First, it will analyze
the constitutional and prudential requirements of the standing doc-
trine, showing that Mendez-Thompson met the constitutional three-
prong test of injury, causation, and redressability, as well as the pru-
dential considerations. Special emphasis is placed on the injury re-
quirement, which "has accurately been described as a 'powerful bar-
rier to federal court review.""' Then, it will outline the purposes
served by the standing requirements. Finally, it will review scholars'
criticism of the standing doctrine.
Section III will discuss essential First Amendment considerations.
It will particularly focus on why the chilling of free speech should
constitute injury under the standing requirements and will consider
the overbreadth doctrine.
I. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE POLITICAL SPEECH AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. International Association of Firefighters Local 2665
v. City of Ferguson
Plaintiffs Lloyd Thompson and his wife Alma Mendez-Thompson,
together with the International Association of Firefighters of St.
Louis, Franklin and Jefferson Counties Local 2665, brought suit9 un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 198310 against the city of Ferguson and the city man-
ager, Alan Gill." The suit challenged a provision of the city charter
that prohibits city employees from engaging in certain political activ-
ity, claiming that it violated their freedom of speech under the First
8 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U.L. REv. 301,
309 (2002) (quoting ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 71
(1997)).
9 Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters Local 2665 v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:00CV00241 ERW, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, at *1-3 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2001) ("Firefighters 1").
10 Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003), providing in part:
Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State .... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in-
jured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
11 Id.
Mar. 2004]
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Amendment. 2  The city argued that the provision was designed to
protect employees from political coercion by candidates.13
The "directly or indirectly" language in the charter provision
meant that Mendez-Thompson could not participate in political activ-
ity, because it would constitute indirect activity on the part of Mr.
Thompson. 4 Mendez-Thompson had participated in political activi-
ties when she lived in New York, assisting with a campaign for a coun-
cilwoman." She had also participated in the re-election campaign of
a candidate for city council in Calverton Park, Missouri, when she
lived there.16 Mendez-Thompson hoped to similarly participate in lo-
cal politics in Ferguson. However, she felt that she was prevented
from doing so because of the city charter provision, as she believed
that it would lead to the termination of her husband's city employ-
ment. 
7
In order to determine whether Mendez-Thompson's fears that her
husband would be fired were justified, her lawyer sent a letter re-
questing the City's interpretation of the provision, but the City did
not answer.' However, Allen Gill, the city manager, testified that the
prohibition on indirectly sponsoring a candidate means that a spouse
cannot contribute to a candidate from a joint checking account held
with a city employee. 9 Also, during deposition under oath, the mayor
of Ferguson, Steven Wegert, testified that he believed that a city em-
ployee's spouse should not contribute to candidates for mayor or
council because it would be difficult to show that the money was not
coming directly from the employee.0 He also stated that he believed
12 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
13 See Firefighters 1, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, at *9 ("'[T]he intent of the restriction con-
tained in the Charter is to protect employees from undue pressure from candidates ...
(quoting Alan Gill, city manager)).
14 SeeFirefighters II, 283 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2002) ("The prohibition against 'indirect,' as




17 See Firefighters I, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, at *8 ("Mendez-Thompson alleges that she
has not been active in the City because of her concern that her husband's job would be in jeop-
ardy.").
a8 Firefighters II, 283 F.3d at 972.
9 Firefighters I, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, at *12 (citing Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment, Ex. E., Gill Dep., at 42).
Id. (citing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. F, Wegert Dep., at 15-22).
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a spouse should not erect yard signs for a candidate for mayor or
council, and should not run for mayor or council.
2 '
Gill and Wegert's statements indicate that if Mendez-Thompson
had participated in local politics, her husband's job would have been
in jeopardy. Because Gill and Wegert are in charge of administering
and enforcing the Ferguson ordinance, Mendez-Thompson's belief
that her husband's job was in jeopardy was reasonable.
It is clear that the city charter provision is valid as applied to Mr.
Thompson. The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment
does not prohibit a law barring partisan political conduct by govern-
ment employees.22 The courts have allowed the government to im-
pose restrictions on public employees speech because First Amend-
ment rights "must yield on occasion to the demands of public
safety. 2 3  The reasoning used to support this argument is that
"[p]eople who become public employees receive certain benefits and
undertake certain duties. One of those duties may require the sur-
render of rights that would otherwise be beyond the reach of gov-
ernmental power. '' 24 In this case, however, Mendez-Thompson is not
a public employee and did not voluntarily give up her First Amend-
ment rights.
In a line of cases beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education25
and Connick v. Myers,26 the Supreme Court has determined that a pub-
lic employee's First Amendment right to free speech is only violated
when the employee's speech relates to matters of public concern and
the employee's interest in speaking outweighs the employer's or gov-• 21
ernment's interest in running an efficient operation. Pickeringwas a
review of an Illinois Supreme Court decision upholding a school
board's dismissal of a teacher for writing a letter to a local newspaper
criticizing the board's handling of various financial matters.28 Connick
involved a district attorney who fired an assistant district attorney.29
21 Id. at *12-13 (citing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. F, Wegert Dep., at
15-22).
2 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606 (1973) ("Appellants do not question Okla-
homa's right to place evenhanded restrictions on the partisan political conduct of state employ-
ees.").
23 Reeder v. Kan. City Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 733 F.2d 543, 547 (8th Cir. 1984).
24 Id. ("It is proper for a state to insist that the police be, and appear to be, above reproach,
like Caesar's wife.").
25 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
26 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
27 See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance be-
tween the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employees.").
28 Id. at 564-68.
2 461 U.S. at 140-41.
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The assistant district attorney had been annoyed by a proposed trans-
fer, and had circulated a questionnaire among her fellow assistants
asking if they were satisfied with their employment.3 0 In Pickering, the
Court held that the teacher's right to speak on matters of public im-
portance could not be used as the reason for dismissal.3 ' In Connick,
the Court held that a violation of the First Amendment did not occur
because the questionnaire was not speech about a matter of public
32
concern.
In Firefighters II, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court,
which held that the provision in question, as applied to Mr. Thomp-
son, was constitutional because it was needed to maintain public con-
fidence in the impartiality of government employees, to encourage
fairness, and to ensure efficiency in city operations. The provision
was also narrowly tailored, applying only to local elections for mayor
and council.3
The district court concluded that Mendez-Thompson lacked
standing to bring her claim challenging the city charter provision. 35
According to the court, "[e]ven if she were to take actions disap-
proved of by the City, the City could take no legal action against her
personally under § 5.3.36 Thus, the court found that she lacked "in-
jury in fact," and therefore did not have standing.3 7 However, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this holding, and held that
Mendez-Thompson did have standing to challenge the provision of
the city charter.8 The Eighth Circuit found that Mendez-Thompson
had been injured by having her First Amendment freedom of speech
rights chilled due to the fear that the city would fire her husband if
she participated in political activities. If this occurred, she would be
economically injured because of her husband's consequent loss of in-
come.39 The court found that "the economic adverse effect on her
would be clear, especially, perhaps, in view of the fact that they have a
joint bank account."4
The reasoning that supports the application of the provision to
Mr. Thompson is not necessarily valid with respect to Mendez-
30 Id. at 141.
31 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574.
32 Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.
33 Firefighters II, 283 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Firefighters I, No. 4:00CV00241, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, at *34 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 17, 2001)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
" Id.
35 Firefighters 1, 2001 U.S. Dist. Lexis 23869, at *29.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 See supra note 6.
39 See id. at 975 ("The injury may be indirect, in that it occurs initially to the husband,
through loss of hisjob. It is nonetheless real and tangible.").
40 Id. at 973.
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Thompson. She is not a city employee and therefore is not required
to remain impartial about local politics. For the same reason, her po-
litical activism would not interfere with the efficient operations of the
city. To find otherwise would imply that because his wife is taking
part in local politics in her own right, Mr. Thompson would relin-
quish his duty to remain impartial by abandoning his own beliefs for
those of his wife. There is no support for such an implication. The
Eighth Circuit was correct to grant Mendez-Thompson standing and
to allow her a chance to show that the provision as it relates to her is
invalid under the First Amendment.
It can be argued that even if Mr. Thompson remains impartial,
the actions of Mendez-Thompson could cause concern on the part of
the Ferguson citizens. This argument would be more valuable if Mr.
Thompson were a public employee with a position that required leg-
islative and policy-making responsibilities. However, Mr. Thompson
is a city firefighter, and does not have the type of responsibilities that
merit this type of concern. Also, Mendez-Thompson and Mr.
Thompson can take action to ensure that her statements are clearly
shown to be her own, minimizing any reason for concern on the part
of the residents.
The Eighth Circuit was correct in granting standing to Mendez-
Thompson because the courts should have a chance to determine if
Ferguson's interests in this case outweigh the strength of Mendez-
Thompson's First Amendment freedom of speech rights. It is possi-
ble that the courts would find that Ferguson's interests outweighed
those of Mendez-Thompson, particularly if the situation were differ-
ent and the public employee involved was high-ranking; however
Mendez-Thompson should at least have the chance to vindicate her
rights in court.
B. Disagreement by the Other Circuit Courts
In holding that Mendez-Thompson had standing, the Eighth Cir-
cuit split with three sister circuits. In Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger,4' the
husband and daughter of a city attorney wanted to engage in local
politics, but the city council ordered them to stop, threatening to fire
the city attorney unless her "'family was silenced in Redlands com-
munity politics.' 4 2 The Ninth Circuit held that the husband and
daughter of the city attorney did not have standing to raise claims of
their own, but only had standing to raise, derivatively, the same
41 189 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 1999).
42 Id. at 992 (quotingJames Foster, city council member).
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claims as the city attorney. This means that the husband and daugh-
ter lacked standing to assert claims that would get the benefit of a
more favorable legal standard than the city attorney's claims.Y In-
stead, the husband and daughter were subject to the same difficult
standards for establishing a First Amendment violation that public
employees face. Thus, the potential harm to the husband and
daughter was described as "indirect.
45
In Horstkoetter v. Department of Public Safety,46 a state trooper's wife
wanted to place a political sign in the front yard of their house.4 v The
Tenth Circuit held that the state trooper's wife had standing only to
raise the same claims as her husband, and not to raise any separate
claims of her own.4 Again, this means that the wife would lack stand-
ing to assert claims that would get the benefit of a more favorable le-
gal standard than the government employee's claims.49 The court ac-
knowledged that indirect economic injury constitutes injury in fact,
50
if the injury is "'neither speculative nor merely incidental.', 1  The
court emphasized the fact that no action could be taken against the
wife directly, so the injury was only indirect, and the wife's claim
would be analyzed under the same set of standards as that of the hus-
band .
In English v. Powell,53 a husband who was demoted by his county
employer was told that if his wife made any further complaints to the
employing board about his demotion, he would be fired.54 His wife
43 See id. at 998-99 ("Although the loss of [the city attorney's] salary is not insubstantial, we
hold that it is only sufficient to confer standing on [the husband and daughter] to assert the
same claims brought by [the city attorney]."). Derivative claims are inferior to direct claims be-
cause the plaintiff is not the person actually injured by the government action. This provides
the courts with less guidance in adjudicating the claim.
44 See id. at 999 ("As a result, because [the husband's and daughter's] claims are derivative of
those of [the city attorney], their claims are subject to the same standards as [the city attor-
ney's] claims.").
45 See id. at 998 ("[T]he only damage to [the husband and daughter] was the indirect harm
that would result from the loss of [the city attorney's] income.").
46 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).
47 Id. at 1269.
48 Id. at 1279.
49 See id. at 1279-80 ("However, the claims of the troopers' wives are exactly the same, and
would be analyzed under the same standards, as the claims of the troopers themselves.").
50 For an example of another court finding that indirect economic injury constituted injury
in fact in a similar context, see Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115
F.3d 1372, 1379 (8th Cir. 1997), as it states: "This burden may be indirect, but it is neither
speculative nor merely incidental."
51 Horstkoetter, 159 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Ben Oehrleins, 115 F.3d at 1379).
52 See id. ("[H]ad the wives elected to leave signs in the yard, the only possible action the
highway patrol could have taken would have been to suspend or terminate the troopers them-
selves.").
53 592 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1979).
54 Id. at 730.
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challenged this action, claiming it was a subjective chill on her First
Amendment rights because she was not allowed to express her disap-
proval to the county composite board.55 She also claimed objective
56harm due to the loss of her husband's income. The Fourth Circuit
held that the wife had no standing to enforce her right to challenge
the demotion despite the fact that she was forced to take on employ-
ment to supplement the family income. The court described this in-
jury as "indirect and speculative"57 because the wife's interest in her
husband's salary did not qualify as a claim."
The Eighth Circuit noted that these circuit courts had held differ-
endy in very similar situations.59 However, it disagreed with these
holdings, stating that the injury to Mendez-Thompson was "real and
tangible."6 ° The court emphasized that the effects of her husband's
job loss on her life and economic status would be "quite substantial."
61
In addition, the loss of income would have just as severe an effect on
Mendez-Thompson as it would on her husband. The court also
found that her claim was "distinct" because her own political expres-
sion was being chilled by the threat of her husband's loss of employ-
ment.
62
The courts should not take the loss of First Amendment free
speech rights by those like Mendez-Thompson lightly. Considering
the number of public employees in the United States, these ordi-
nances could suppress the free political expression of a large portion
of the population. Standing should be granted to Mendez-
Thompson, and others in similar situations, so that courts can con-
sider whether the state's interest in prohibiting public employee





58 Id. ("It is a novel theory that a wife possesses such a proprietary interest in her husband's
position that a decrease in his salary gives her an actionable claim. Plaintiffs admit that this the-
ory is without precedent, and we decline to write new law on the facts of this case.").
59 Firefighters II, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2002) ("We express our disagreement with these
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II. THE STANDING DOCTRINE IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. Rationales Underlying the Standing Doctrine
Article III of the Constitution limits the 'judicial power" of the
United States to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies. 63 The
constitutional power of federal courts is "'to adjudge the legal rights
of litigants in actual controversies.',64  The concern with standing to
bring suit stems from the separation of powers doctrine and the posi-
tion of the judiciary with respect to the legislative and executive
65branches. The judicial branch is limited by the Constitution to re-
view decisions of the other branches only by deciding actual cases
under the law, while the legislative branch is responsible for creating
the law. If the courts took cases without a real dispute and injury,
they would infringe on the legislature's power to create laws.
In addition to the separation of powers concerns, there are other
rationales that underlie the standing doctrine. It is argued that
standing requirements improve the quality of the courts' decisions by
requiring: (a) a well-developed real-life dispute so that there is a
"concrete factual context" for developing the law; and (b) a plaintiff
with a personal stake in the litigation so that both parties are moti-
vated to litigate zealously, thus bringing out all relevant facts and le-
gal arguments. 67 This is strongly connected to the injury requirement
in the standing doctrine. However, it seems that neither a real-life
dispute nor a plaintiff with a personal stake ensures that the legal
standards governing the case will be fully developed and all of the
facts will be divulged. Another justification for the standing doctrine
is conservation of judicial resources. 6  Standing should not be
63 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separa-
tion of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-73 (1982) ("But the 'cases and controversies'
language of Art. III forecloses the conversion of courts of the United States into judicial ver-
sions of college debating forums.").
CA Id. at 471 (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v. Comm'rs of Emigration, 113 U.S.
33, 39 (1885)).
65 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("Standing doctrine embraces several judi-
cially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as... the rule barring ad-
judication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative
branches.... ").
Meghan Tomasik, Note, Nothing to Stand on: Reading the Standing Doctrine to Include Reli-
gious Proclamations Through Arizona Civil Liberties Union v. Durham, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 345, 354
(2002) (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 472).
67 See, e.g., Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright: The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and
Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REv. 163, 193 (2001) ("A principal rationale for standing doctrine is to
make sure that plaintiffs are sufficiently vested in the outcome of a case so that they seek to vig-
orously argue their position.").
See, e.g., Brandon D. Smith, Note, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: A Slash-and-Burn Expedi-
tion Through the Law of Environmental Standing, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 859, 863 (1994) ("Theoretically,
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denied, however, to a plaintiff who has important rights to be vindi-
cated solely to conserve judicial resources.
Finally, judicial discretion is important. Some scholars have ar-
gued that the flexibility of the standing doctrine is good because it
gives courts discretion as to when and under what circumstances they
will hear certain types of disputes.69 Of course, other scholars believe
that this discretion is not a positive attribute because it prevents the
courts from setting forth a clear standard that allows plaintiffs to rec-
ognize what must be argued in order for standing to be granted.
In the case of Mendez-Thompson, a real-life dispute has occurred.
The ordinance prevents her from taking part in political activities
guaranteed under the First Amendment because she fears that her
husband will lose his job, and thus, they will lose his income. It is
true that Mendez-Thompson has not participated in political activity
to see if Mr. Thompson would be fired. However, longstanding case
law suggests that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to participate in the
activity. Mendez-Thompson has a strong reason for litigating zeal-
ously, particularly considering her history of political activity and her
desire to continue such activities in Ferguson.
Some of these rationales are reflected in the decisions of those
circuit courts that did not grant the spouse of a 7public employee
separate standing under differing legal standards. Certainly, the
judges were allowed discretion to determine that the spouses should
not have separate standing, and this would conserve judicial re-
sources. However, these justifications should not warrant refusing to
hear a plaintiff with important First Amendment freedoms at stake.
B. Article III Constitutional Requirements
To satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III,
which is the "'irreducible constitutional minimum' '7 2 of standing, a
plaintiff must present a concrete dispute involving a personal injury.73
standing constricts the potential flood of lawsuits which would overwhelm the judiciary if liti-
gants with merely ideological and not personalized interests were allowed to sue.").
69 See, e.g., Neal Devins & Michael A. Fitts, The Triumph of Timing: Raines v. Byrd and the Mod-
en Supreme Court's Attempt to Control Constitutional Conftontations, 86 GEO. L.J. 351, 372 (1997)
("Because the standing doctrine is not 'a highly principled and predictable process,' it can af-
ford the Court the 'judicial discretion to engage in such avoidance of decision' and the 'flexibil-
ity needed to discharge the Article III function wisely.'" (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 87 (2d ed. 1988))).
70 See Firefighters II, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
71 See, e.g., Horstkoetter v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 1998).
72 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560-61 (1992), and Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1982)).
73 Id.
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A plaintiff must meet three constitutional requirements: (1) injury-
the plaintiff must allege that she has suffered or imminently will suf-
fer an injury; (2) causation-the plaintiff must allege that the injury is
fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct; and (3) redressability-
the plaintiff must allege that a favorable federal court decision is
likely to redress her injury.
4
As discussed further below, Mendez-Thompson meets all of the
standing requirements. This section focuses on the injury require-
ment of the test, as it is the requirement that the other circuit courts
incorrectly found was not met in situations similar to Mendez-
Thompson. After demonstrating that the injury test has been satis-
fied, this Comment will argue that the injury to Mendez-Thompson is
fairly traceable to the Ferguson ordinance, and that Mendez-
Thompson's injury can be redressed by changes to the ordinance.
1. Injury Analysis
An injury is necessary because it is thought to give the plaintiff the
desire to argue vigorously.75 Situations with an injury to a particular
plaintiff provide the format best suited for judicial resolution,
whereas without injuy the legislature might be a better body from
which to seek redress. To prove an injury, a plaintiff must have suf-
fered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a legally protected interest
that is "concrete and particularized." 77 The injury also must be "actual
or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' 78  While some
scholars argue that this standard seems very straightforward, 79 the
Court continues to expand and contract the definition of what
74 Id.
75 See Note, And Justiciability for All?: Future Injury Plaintiffs and the Separation of Powers, 109
HARv. L. REv. 1066, 1072 & n.46 (1996) (citing ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §
2.3.2 (2d ed. 1994)).
76 See Valley Forge Christian Coll., 454 U.S. at 471-75 ("The effect is, of course, most vivid when
a federal court declared unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch.").
77 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 (1984) ("It is in their complaint's second claim of
injury that respondents allege harm to a concrete, personal interest that can support standing
in some circumstances."); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975) (stating that a plaintiff chal-
lenging exclusionary zoning practices must provide "specific, concrete facts"); Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 740 n.16 (1972) (quoting De Tocqueville's observation that "judicial
review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan faction, but
is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury'").
78 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 101-02 (1983)).
See Nichol, supra note 8, at 309 ("It should not require the skill of Lord Coke to determine
whether someone is injured 'in fact.' Plaintiffs are either hurt or they are not. Harms are ei-
ther real or fanciful. They are concrete or abstract, individual or shared, objective or subjective,
particular or common, hypothetical or imminent.").
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constitutes an injury. This has created widespread confusion and
criticism among some scholars and lower courts alike. s
In the case at hand, Mendez-Thompson has suffered an injury.
Her First Amendment right to free speech was chilled because she
feared her husband would be fired, causing an economic injury-the
loss of his income.8'
It does not matter that Mendez-Thompson has not been specifi-
cally threatened with the enforcement of the provision. The courts
have held that when a plaintiff wants to engage in an action that in-
volves First Amendment rights, but cannot do so because she is lim-
ited by statute, there is standing to challenge the issue, "'even absent
specific threats of enforcement.'-82 Even though the danger of sus-
taining the injury must be realistic, "' [o] ne does not have to await the
consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief. If the
injury is certainly impending that is enough."'.
The testimony by the city manager, Allen Gill, and the deposition
of Mayor Wegert show that if Mendez-Thompson had engaged in po-
litical activity, it would have been considered an action in contraven-
tion of the charter provision, and she would have had to face the con-
sequential loss of her husband's income. 4 While it has not been
shown that the city punishes every person who acts in contravention
of this ordinance, it appears that the city manager and mayor felt that
there was a strong possibility that Mr. Thompson would be fired. At
any time, the city could determine that the statute had been violated
and fire Mr. Thompson accordingly. In addition to the economic
loss, Mendez-Thompson's First Amendment rights will continue to be
chilled because of her concern that her husband could be fired.
The three circuit courts that held that a spouse did not have
standing seemed to have been concerned with the indirectness of the
815injury to the spouse of the public employee. It is not clear why the
courts would believe that the injury sustained by Mendez-Thompson
was indirect. In general, a married couple is treated as a single
80 See EricJ. Kuhn, Standing: Stood up at the Courthouse Door, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 886, 892
(1996) ("The Court's willingness to recognize certain injuries while dismissing other similar
ones has baffled commentators and has been the target of widespread criticism.").
81 Firefighters 11, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
82 See Firefighters I, No. 4:00CU00241 ERW, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23869, at *26 (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 17, 2001) (quoting United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. IBP, Inc., 857 F.2d
422, 428 (8th Cir. 1988) (granting standing to picketers because they were likely to engage in
further picketing in violation of the statute, yet were arguably protected by the Constitution)).
83 Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (quoting Pennsyl-
vania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)).
84 Firefighters II, 283 F.3d at 972-73.
85 See, e.g., Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 1999) ("As in Horstkoetter,
the only damage to [the husband and daughter] was the indirect harm that would result from
the loss of [the city attorney's] income.").
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economic unit. For example, the laws regarding taxes and govern-
ment benefits treat married persons as one unit, along with gift and
estate tax laws. 6 The reason for this is that "[g] overnment taxing and
benefit regulations of other sorts also build on the expectation that
married couples will share resources and recoiize that one spouse is
often economically dependent on the other." This concept should
also be recognized in the case at hand. The loss of Mr. Thompson's
income would be a direct economic injury to Mendez-Thompson be-
cause it would harm the single economic unit of Mendez-Thompson
and Mr. Thompson.
Even if a court found that the economic injury to Mendez-
Thompson would be indirect, it should not be the end of her stand-
ing case. In Warth v. Seldin,5 the Court recognized that indirectness
was not necessarily fatal to standing. Although, it does make it sub-
stantially more difficult to meet the Article III requirement that the
injury be a consequence of the defendant's actions or that prospec-
tive relief will remove the harm. 9 First, Mendez-Thompson's First
Amendment free speech rights are chilled by the ordinance directly.
Second, Mendez-Thompson's potential economic injuries should also
qualify as direct injury. Finally, even if the injury is deemed indirect,
and requires a higher standard, Mendez-Thompson does meet the
Article III requirements of injury, causation and redressability.
a. Economic Injury
Economic harm has often qualified as a sufficient injury for a
court to grant standing.90 In Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organiza-
tions v. Camp,9' for example, the Court granted standing to a bank
86 David L. Chambers, Essay, What I7 The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of
Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REv. 447, 472-74 (1996). Examples of these laws in-
clude joint tax returns, social security benefits that are derived through a working spouse to a
spouse who has never worked in the labor force, and transfers of property to a spouse not sub-
ject to federal gift tax. See Kelly M. Martin, Note, Loss of Consortium: Should California Protect Co-
habitants'Relational Interest?, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 1467, 1476 (1996) (citing Grace Ganz Blumberg,
Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1125, 1133-34 (1981) (ar-
guing that couples are a single economic unit; they live together, make purchases as a unit, and
contribute to the financial well-being of the unit by helping to support each other)).
87 Chambers, supra note 86, at 474.
88 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
89 Id. at 505.
90 See, e.g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (granting standing for a change
in market conditions); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (granting standing to tenant
farmers to challenge a regulation forcing them to assign benefits in advance as a condition to
obtaining a lease to work the land); Hardin v. Ky. Utils. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 6 (1968) ("[W]hen the
particular statutory provision invoked does reflect a legislative purpose to protect a competitive
interest, the injured competitor has standing to require compliance with that provision.").
91 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
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based on economic injury caused by a government ruling allowing
competition from data processing companies. These data processing
companies were providing services to bank customers, and these were
services that the bank had previously provided.92 In Clinton v. City of
New York,93 the State was granted standing based of the economic in-
jury it suffered after President Clinton used his line item veto power.
The President used his veto power to cancel the elimination of a mul-
tibillion-dollar contingent liability.94 The Court also granted standing
to the Snake River farmers' cooperative because it suffered injury
when the "President canceled the limited tax benefit that Congress
had enacted to facilitate the acquisition of processing plants." 95 The
Court granted standing despite the fact that the cooperative could
not show that it would have actually been able to benefit from the tax
benefits in the first place.96 Standing has therefore been granted
even when economic injury was not certain to occur.
The court could still grant standing when the plaintiff claims only
potential indirect economic injury. In Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daugh-
ter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, the Eighth Circuit held that indirect eco-
nomic injury constituted an injury in fact for standing requirements. 97
The plaintiffs were businesses, and their injury was that they had to
pay higher fees for waste collection.98 Waste haulers had passed on
the costs of higher disposal resulting from the county's Ordinance 12
by requiring "all 'designated waste,' which includes most forms of
nonhazardous commercial and residential solid waste, be delivered
only to County-designed transfer stations or processing facilities."9
The court held that the haulers generally responded by charging the
waste generators higher fees, and that this economic burden was
"concrete, particularized, and actual, and [was] in no way hypotheti-
cal or conjectural."'0 °
92 Id. at 152. The Court further noted:
The petitioners not only allege that competition by national banks in the business of
providing data processing services might entail some future loss of profits for the peti-
tioners, they also allege that respondent American National Bank & Trust Company was
performing or preparing to perform such services for two customers for whom petitioner
Data Systems, Inc., had previously agreed or negotiated to perform such services.
Id.
93 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
94 See id. at 430-31 ("The revival of a substantial contingent liability immediately and directly
affects the borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning of the potential obligor.").
95 Id. at 432 ("By depriving them of their statutory bargaining chip, the cancellation inflicted
a sufficient likelihood of economic injury to establish standing under our precedents.").
96 Id. at 432-36.
97 115 F.3d 1372, 1379 (1997).
98 Id.
9 Id. at 1377.
100 Id. at 1379; cf Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1387 (8th Cir. 1993)
(holding that financial burden from flow control ordinance rests in part on waste generators).
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Indirect economic harm can be enough to constitute injury in
fact. In this particular case, Mendez-Thompson would suffer the sub-
stantial economic injury of the loss of her husband's income, which
would have a large effect on her life. Even if her injury were indirect,
the situation is different than that faced by plaintiffs in Ben Oehrleins
because in Ben Oehrleins the injury was based on the economic deci-
sions of another business in response to a government action.
Mendez-Thompson faces injury because of the effect a government
action will have on her finances. Therefore, the economic harm
faced by Mendez-Thompson should not be qualified as indirect, but
in fact as direct injury. As discussed above, the determination of eco-
nomic harm will likely depend on whether Mendez-Thompson and
Mr. Thompson are determined to be a single economic unit or sepa-
rate individuals. Combined with the direct chill on her First
Amendment freedom of speech rights, Mendez-Thompson meets the
concrete and imminent constitutional injury requirement.
b. When Standing Has Been Granted for Less Concrete Injuries
In certain situations, the Court has granted standing to plaintiffs
who, unlike Mendez-Thompson, do not appear to have suffered indi-
vidual injury. Professor Nichol observed that federal taxpayers have
gained standing in order to challenge "spending programs assisting
religious institutions without demonstrating individual injury."'O° For
example, in Bowen v. Kendrick,'0 2 the Court granted standing to a
group of federal taxpayers, clergymen, and the American Jewish
Congress to adjudicate an as-applied challenge to the Adolescent
Family Life Act, which authorized federal funding to organizations
with religious ties. 0 3 "Frequently, the opinions in these cases don't
even appear to acknowledge an injury requirement."0 4  In other
cases, the Court has found sufficient individual injury to grant stand-
ing, although that injury has seemed negligible. For example, in
Craig v. Boren,°10 standing was granted based on the harm suffered by
an eighteen-year-old boy who was unable to buy an alcoholic bever-
age. 16 Also, in several voting rights cases, plaintiffs have been granted
101 Nichol, supra note 8, at 310 & n.33 (citing Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 619 (1988);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676 (1971); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 88 (1968)).
102 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
103 Id. at 619.
104 Nichol, supra note 8, at 310.
105 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
106 Id. at 194.
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standing when their interest in the outcome reflected no more than a
fraction of a vote.
0 7
The Court has also granted standing in several cases where the
plaintiff was unable to show that he would be eligible to enjoy any
changes in the law.10 8 In Bryant v. Yellen, °9 the Court granted standing
to farmers "even though they could not with certainty establish that
they would be able to purchase excess lands if § 46 were held appli-
cable.""0 The decision concerned whether a rule limiting water de-
liveries to 160 acres from a reclamation project applied to the Impe-
rial Irrigation District in southeastern California. This would have
given large landowners an incentive to sell excess land at prices below
the market price."' The Court held that the rule did not apply. The
farmers who had hoped to purchase land appealed and were granted
standing, despite the fact that they could not show they would have
been able to purchase the land initially."
2
Finally, the Court has granted standing for expressive harms.
Unlike those injuries normally recognized, such as physical or eco-
nomic injuries, expressive harms are "specifically concerned with the
messag -- often a message of racial, gender, or religious inferiority-
expressed by governmental action." The case of Gladstone, Realtors
v. Village of Bellwood is an example of a case where an expressive harm
was injury enough to grant standing. ' 4  In Gladstone, the plaintiffs
brought suit claiming that realtors in their community were practic-
ing racial "steering," or directing prospective homebuyers to certain
neighborhoods according to their race. The Court found that
107 See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (granting standing to chal-
lenge a $1.50 poll tax); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (granting standing based on a frac-
tion of a vote); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (granting standing for a $5 fine and
costs).
1o See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737-40 (1984) (allowing an attack on social
security rule giving more benefits to females even though Congress had decided that if the plan
were to be invalidated both men and women would receive a lower amount); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 271-72 (1979) (allowing a challenge to a state law limiting alimony liability to males
and alimony benefits to women, even though the plaintiff would have been liable for alimony,
but not eligible for payment from his wife as he would if the law were gender neutral); Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (allowing challenges to medical school admis-
sions programs giving preference to minorities even when the particular plaintiff would not
have been admitted if the challenged preference system were eliminated).
109 447 U.S. 352 (1980).
Ito Id. at 367.
II Id. at 355.
11 Id. at 367.
13 Note, Expressive Harms and Standing, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1314 & n.7 (1999) (citing
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights:
Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506-07 (1993)
(coining the term "expressive harm")).
114 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
135 Id. at 94-95.
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individuals who resided in the community had standing because they
were deprived of the advantages of living in an integrated commu-
nity.'1 6 This is one of several cases where the Court has allowed stand-
ing based on subjective "'benefits of interracial association.'
117
Of course, expressive harms are not the only injuries caused by ra-
cial steering. There are certainly economic injuries experienced by
disfavored racial groups. However, the courts have held that the ex-
pressive harms caused by racial steering do constitute injury so that
standing should be granted.
The point is not that these plaintiffs should have been denied
standing. Rather, if plaintiffs with these types of injuries are granted
standing, Mendez-Thompson is just as, if not more, deserving of the
right to pursue her case. Beyond expressive harms, which are sub-
stantial, Mendez-Thompson would suffer an economic injury that is
certainly no less concrete and imminent than the expressive harms
that include the "benefits of interracial association." Free political
speech protected under the First Amendment, with its promotion of
diverse ideas and.belief systems, is one of the important foundations
that led to integrated communities in the United States. If living
without the advantages of an integrated community is an injury de-
serving standing, and it certainly is, then the prohibition of free
speech is as well.
c. Environmental Standing
Environmental cases have seen the greatest expansion of injury
analysis with regard to standing. In these cases a showing of harm
less concrete than economic injury has been sufficient for standing.
In Ass'n of Data Processing Service Organizations v. Camp,"8 the Court de-
cided that an injury sufficient for standing included "'aesthetic, con-
servational, and recreational' as well as economic values."" 9 These
116 See id. at 112-14 (granting standing based on the loss of benefits of interracial associa-
tions).
117 Nichol, supra note 8, at 317 (quoting Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
209-10 (1972) (recognizing standing under the Civil Rights Act of 1968 for injury for loss of im-
portant benefits from interracial association)). Standing in these cases was based on the statu-
tory standing provisions of the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing Act, respectively. However,
in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), a nonstatutory case, the Court rejected the assertion of
standing.
11 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
19 Id. at 154 (quoting Scenic Hudson Pres. Conference v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608,
616 (2d Cir. 1965)); see also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) ("Aesthetic and
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of
life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many




aesthetic and conservational values go beyond the standard economic
injuries because they are less concrete, and therefore, harder to
prove. It is also more difficult to prove that these aesthetic injuries
are actual or imminent rather than conjectural. If these values can
be sufficient to establish a concrete, imminent, economic injury, a
chill on First Amendment rights must also create sufficient injury to
support a finding of standing.
In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
("SCRAP'), '2 members of an environmental group protested a freight
rate increase by railroads as it related to the shipment of recycled
goods. 2 ' They alleged that the increase would "discourage the use of
'recyclable' materials, and promote the use of new raw materials that
compete with scrap, thereby adversely affecting the environment by
encouraging unwarranted mining, lumbering, and other extractive
activities."' 2 - The group argued that the increased use of new raw
products would ultimately create more litter in the Washington, D.C.
area where the students hiked, fished, and backpacked. 2 3 In addi-
tion, they claimed that they breathed the air and used the rivers, for-
ests, mountains and streams, as well as other natural resources in the
area that would be affected by the rate hike.2 4
The Court found standing, despite recognizing that the "alleged
injury to the environment [was] far less direct and perceptible" and
"the Court was asked to follow a far more attenuated line of causation
to the eventual injury"2 5 than in Sierra Club v. Morton, where the Court
did not grant standing. 26 The Court distinguished Sierra Club because
its members had never used Mineral King Valley, the area of natural
resources at issue, and thus, failed to allege a specific injury, whereas
the plaintiffs in SCRAP had alleged harm to their ability to use natu-
ral resources.
Similar to SCRAP, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlfe, 7 the Court held
that plaintiffs did not have standing because they could not demon-
strate that they had suffered "imminent" injury simply because they
had once visited, and planned to return to, the federal land that was
being mined under new federal regulations . 2  "Such 'some day'
12 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
121 Id. at 675-76.
122 Id. at 676 ("The members of these environmental groups were allegedly forced to pay
more for finished products, and their use of forests and streams was allegedly impaired because
of unnecessary destruction of timber and extraction of raw materials, and the accumulation of
otherwise recyclable solid and liquid waste materials.").
123 Id. at 678.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 688.
126 Id.
127 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
28 Id. at 564.
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intentions-without any description of concrete plans, or indeed
even any specification of when the some day will be-do not support a
finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that our cases require. ',1 9
Unlike the plaintiffs in Sierra Club who had never used the land,
and the plaintiffs in Lujan who claimed only to have the intent to re-
visit project sites at some indefinite point in the future, Mendez-
Thompson has participated in local politics on several occasions.
And like the plaintiffs in SCRAP, who had used and planned on con-
tinuing to use the effected land specifically for recreational use,
Mendez-Thompson wanted to participate in specific local elections in
the immediate future. Her inability to do so demonstrated an "im-
minent" and concrete injury that deserved judicial recognition.
2. Causation Analysis
After the court determines that the plaintiff suffered an injury suf-
ficient to confer standing, it must determine causation. In order for
a plaintiff to prove causation, there must be a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to
be an injury that is "'fairly ... trace [able] to the challenged action of
the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action
of some third party not before the court."""m Critics argue that causa-
tion is another element the Court manipulates based on its view of
the merits.
3 1
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 3 the Inter-
nal Revenue Service ("IRS") issued a ruling allowing favorable tax
treatment for nonprofit hospitals that offered only emergency room
services to indigents.3 3 The Court recognized that indigent plaintiffs
might have suffered an injury, in that they might lose access to hospi-
tals or might be denied hospital services because of their indigence.
3 4
However, the Court did not grant standing because the plaintiffs sued
1 Id. (referring to "imminent" requirement elucidated by Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 155 (1990)).
130 Id. at 560 (alterations in original) (quoting Simon v. E. Welfare Ky. Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 41-42 (1976)).
131 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 344-46 (1985); see also Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 782 & n.10 (1984) (Brennan,J., dissenting) ("More than one commentator has noted
that the causation component of the Court's standing inquiry is no more than a poor disguise
for the Court's view of the merits of the underlying claims.") (citing LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 3-21 (1978)); Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981
Term-Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-22 (1982); Gene
R. Nichol, Jr., Causation as a Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use ofJudicial Restraint, 69 KY.
L.J. 185 (1980); Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 663 (1977)).
132 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
133 Id. at 28.
134 Id. at 40.
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a Treasury official, not any named hospitals.15 ' The Court found that
"[i] t is purely speculative whether the denials of service specified in
the complaint fairly can be traced to petitioners' 'encouragement' or
instead result from decisions made by the hospitals without regard to
the tax implications.'
3 6
This is in direct contrast to the injury caused to Mendez-
Thompson. Her injuries, both the economic harm she would suffer
from loss of her husband's income and the chill on her First
Amendment free speech rights, stem directly from the Ferguson or-
dinance. The ordinance described actions that could potentially be
taken against her husband by the city if it found that he acted in con-
travention of the statute due to Mendez-Thompson's actions. En-
forcement of the ordinance was the direct cause of Mendez-
Thompson's fear that she could not express her political views with-
out endangering her husband's employment as a city firefighter.
3. Redressability Analysis
After proving injury and causation, the plaintiff must show re-
dressability. It must be "likely," as opposed to merely speculative, that
the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision.' '17 If Mendez-
Thompson were to prevail in this suit the ordinance would be invali-
dated because the defendants are those who administer and enforce
the ordinance. If the ordinance were declared invalid in this respect,
she would be free to express her political speech in accordance with
the First Amendment without fearing for her husband's employment.
C. Standing and Prudential Considerations
In addition to the Article III constitutional elements, the doctrine
of standing also includes "prudential" concerns that limit the exercise
of federal jurisdiction . 3  First, the complaint must fall within the
zone of interests protected by the invoked law. Second, a plaintiffmust usually assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest
135 Id. at 4243.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 38; see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (stating
same).
138 See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997) (discussing the numerous and mutable
prudential concerns of standing which limit federal courts' jurisdiction and adjudicating stand-
ing based on the "zone of interests" prudential concern).
139 See id. ("[A] plaintiff's grievance must arguably fall within the zone of interests protected
or regulated by the statutory provision or constitutional guarantee invoked in the suit."); see also
Ass'n of Data Processing Servs. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970) (employing the "zone of
interests" formulation for the first time).
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his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. 14 °
Third, the suit must present more than abstract questions of wide
public significance that amount to generalized grievances, pervasively
shared and most appropriately addressed in the representative
branches of the government.
4
1
Mendez-Thompson would prevail under the zone of interests test.
The First Amendment is specifically addressed to United States citi-
zens. The First Amendment directly protects the political activity that
Mendez-Thompson wants to engage in. Because political speech is,
in fact, one of the most important types of speech that is protected by
the First Amendment, it should not be taken lightly when considered
in the context of standing.
This suit also presented more than a generalized grievance. Gen-
eralized grievances often come up in suits brought by citizens as tax-
payers or suits brought under the Administrative Procedure Act. In
this particular case, Mendez-Thompson brought suit because of an
injury she alone had sustained. She was not acting as part of a large
group that believed the government was passing legislation that was
unconstitutional; rather, she is bringing suit because the city of Fer-
guson injured her in a way that the First Amendment prohibits.
1. Third Party Standing
Even when a plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the
"case" or "controversy" requirements, she must assert her own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest her claim to relief solely on the
legal rights or interests of third parties.Y While this principle seems
straightforward, like the injury requirement, it is not always easy to
determine if the complaint asserts only the rights of others. The rule
against third party standing is generally thought to help courts exer-
cise judicial restraint and adjudicate only actual, rather than hypo-
thetical, disputes.4 3  It also protects courts from becoming "roving
140 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (denying standing based on the holding that
"the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties").
141 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 (rejecting the Eighth Circuit's holding that the abstract "right"
to have executives adhere to procedures required by law which is conferred upon all persons
satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement for standing).
142 SeeJAMES P. GEORGE, THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE DOOR: A FEDERALJURISDICTION GUIDE
30 (2002) ("Parties ordinarily have no standing to challenge a statute's constitutionality if its
adverse effect is to others.").
143 See, e.g., Michael A. Frattone, Third Circuit Sets Forth Balancing Test for Evaluating Jus Tertii
Standing in First Amendment Context: Amato v. Wilentz (1991), 38 VILL. L. REv. 1117, 1120 (1993)
(discussing the policies behind jurisprudential bias against third party standing).
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commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's
laws."
144
While the district court held otherwise, Mendez-Thompson
brought suit based on her own chilled First Amendment rights and
economic injury, not those of her husband. As the Eighth Circuit
noted, "[her] claim is distinct. It is that her own political rights can-
not be chilled by the threat of discipline against her husband."45 She
wanted to be able to express her own political views as a nonpublic
employee; this requires a different analysis than would occur if Mr.
Thompson, as a public employee, tested the legality of the ordinance.
When these prudential policies are not met, the Court is some-
times willing to relax the rule against third party standing. 46 Excep-
tions to the third party rule include the overbreadth doctrine, 47 dis-
cussed in Section III below, and thejus tertii standing cases, in which
litigants related to third parties are able to raise the third party's
rights. 48 Therefore, those who have met the case and controversy re-
quirement may be granted standing to invoke the rights of a third
party in some circumstances.
2. Jus Tertii Exception to Third Party Standing
The general restriction on asserting third party standing is not ab-
solute. There are limited exceptions for specific situations, particu-
larly situations where First Amendment rights are at issue. "More-
over, other policy considerations, notably the fear of chilling
expression in First Amendment cases, may at times outweigh the
policies behind the general rule against third party standing.'
49
144 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11 (1973).
145 Firefighters I, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
146 See Frattone, supra note 143, at 1122 ("Since the Barrows decision, the Supreme Court has
consistently recognized jus tertii standing to be appropriate when the policies underlying the
restrictions on such standing are not furthered.").
147 See Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278 (1984) ("In-
creasingly, litigants whose own activities are assumed to fall within a statute's valid applications
are permitted to assert the statute's potentially invalid applications with respect to persons not
before the court."); Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844, 848
n.18 (1970) (asserting that "[s]tatutory overbreath-susceptibility to invalid application-can
be conceptualized in terms of hypothetical privileged persons coming within the statutory
ban").
148 See Monaghan, supra note 147, at 278 (discussing the overbreadth andjus tertii docrines).
Monaghan distinguished the two:
In differentiating jus tertii from overbreadth standing commentators have empha-
sized the relationship between the litigant and the third party right holders. In ajus ter-
tii case, the litigant has a preexisting relationship with "real" third parties whose interests
are implicated; in an overbreadth case, the litigant is permitted to raise the rights of "hy-
pothetical" third persons.
Id. at 278 n.5.
149 Amato v. 'Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 748-49 (3d Cir. 1991).
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When the constitutional rights of someone who is not a party to liti-
gation would be harmed, and the person effected has no way to pre-
serve their rights, the Court will grant standing to a third party to de-
fend those rights. 15° However, the litigant still must have suffered
injury in fact and be closely related to the third party, as well as meet-
ing the case or controversy requirement before prudential considera-
tions are examined.' 51 The Supreme Court has set forth three factors
for examining prudential considerations: "(1) the relationship be-
tween the litigant and the third party; (2) the ability of the third party
to advance his own interests; and (3) the impact of potential litiga-
tion by the third party."
5 2
Third party standing is illustrated by Barrows v. Jackson153 and
NAACP v. Alabama.5 4 In these cases, the Supreme Court allowed liti-
gants to invoke the rights of other parties because the other parties
were not in a position to assert their own rights. At times, the Court
has even granted standing when there was no barrier to the party act-
ing on its own behalf.
155
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,"5 the Court allowed a doctor, who was prose-
cuted for distributing contraceptive foam to unmarried women, to
defend the rights of individuals to have access to and use contracep-
tives. The Court stated, "unmarried persons denied access to contra-
ceptives in Massachusetts... [were] not themselves subject to prose-
cution and, to that extent, [were] denied a forum in which to assert
their own rights." 57  The Court granted standing to the doctor to
150 See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459-60 (1958) (deeming the NAACP the
appropriate party to assert its individual members' rights not to disclose their membership
status); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953) (granting standing to white co-covenantor
to invoke constitutional rights of blacks affected by the racially restrictive covenant at issue
because "the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which
is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the fundamental rights which
would be denied" by refusing standing).
151 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991). The Court explained:
The litigant must have suffered an "injury in fact," thus giving him or her a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute; the litigant must have a close
relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's abil-
ity to protect his or her own interests.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112-16 (1976)).
152 Frattone, supra note 143, at 1123.
153 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
1 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
155 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (granting standing to a beer vendor who argued
that her potential male customers were victims of sex discrimination despite the fact that the
customers faced no barriers to bringing an action on their own behalves).
156 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
157 Id. at 446; see also Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 118 (1976) ("[W]e conclude that it
generally is appropriate to allow a physician to assert the rights of women patients as against
governmental interference with the abortion decision, and we decline to restrict our holding to
that effect in Doe to its purely criminal context.").
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assert his unmarried patient's rights because they were unable to sue
on their own behalf. Surely Mendez-Thompson, who is asserting her
own rights, was also correctly granted standing.
Third party standing is also sometimes permitted when the indi-
vidual seeking standing is integrally connected to the third party's
constitutionally protected activity. In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 158 the
Court held that a parochial school had standing to challenge an Ore-
gon law requiring all parents to send their children to public school
and making a parent's failure to do so a misdemeanor." 9 The Court
found that the law violated the rights of parents to control the up-
bringing of their children. In part it seemed that the school was
granted standing because of the close relationship between the
school and the parents and because the school was part of the "useful
and meritorious" activity of providing primary education. 6 ° Mendez-
Thompson suffered from personal, concrete injury and was not trying
to assert her rights through a third person. However, if the Court
grants a school standing to assert the rights of parents because the
school was part of the regulated activity, Mendez-Thompson was cor-
rectly granted standing because she was also part of the regulated ac-
tivity. Her political speech is prohibited by the Ferguson ordinance
due to the "indirectly" language.
D. Slamming the Courthouse Door
Despite a long-standing set of standards, critics have accused the
Supreme Court of using standing to ""'slam the courthouse door" -161
when the Court should have considered the merits of a case. Critics
have also accused the Court of disfavoring the standing of a plaintiff
based on various considerations, including "separation of powers,
' 62
158 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
159 Id. at 530.
160 Id. at 534.
161 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 766 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ars. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 490 (1982)
(Brennan,J., dissenting) (quoting Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan,J., con-
curring in the result and dissenting))).
162 Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV.
635, 649 & n.70 (1985) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976) (not-
ing the principle that the court must not "overstep[] its assigned role in our system") (altera-
tion in original); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974)
(warning that to adjudicate in the absence of actual injury would "distort the role of the Judici-
ary in its relationship to the Executive and the Legislature"); United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 179 (1974) (stating supervision of government is a congressional, not a judicial, func-
tion); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (noting that the function of monitoring the execu-
tive branch is most appropriately left to Congress)).
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"federalism,"163 "limits on the exercise of judicial remedial powers,
16
1
and "the Court's view of the claim on the legal merits.'' 65 Some critics
have also argued that the justices make decisions based on their own
views as to whether they believe the legal claim in the case is one
worth taking the time to review,1
66 or based on personal experience.
67
Often, the Court does not provide strong and detailed opinions as to
why some plaintiffs are granted standing while others, in seemingly
similar situations, are not.
163 Nichol, supra note 162, at 649 & n.71 (citing City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 112
(1983) (noting that federal courts should be mindful of the balance between state and federal
power); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976) ("[A]ppropriate consideration must be given
to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.");
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 499 (1974) (recognizing that the balance between state and
federal courts "counsels restraint against the issuance of injunctions")).
164 Nichol, supra note 162, at 649 & n.72 (citing Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United
for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 488-90 ("The Court of Appeals in this case
ignored unambiguous limitations on taxpayer and citizen standing.")).
165 Id. at 649 & n.73 (comparing Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (granting standing for an
equal protection challenge against a state alimony law applying only to husbands) and Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (defining standing broadly to up-
hold a federal limitation on nuclear power plant liability) to O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974) (denying standing in a challenge to alleged racial discrimination in a state court sys-
tem), and Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (denying standing plaintiffs challeng-
ing child support laws enforced only on behalf of legitimate children); see also id. at 641 & n.30
(citing Mark V. Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REV.
663 (1977), for his discussion that the Court often manipulated standing rules based on its
views of the merits of particular cases).
See Nichol, supra note 8, at 304 ("[Standing] also systematically favors the powerful over
the powerless .... As elite judges summarily determine which interests are worthy of legal cog-
nizance, they unsurprisingly embrace concerns that strike closest to home, sustaining 'harms'
that mirror the experiences and predilections of their own lives.").
167 See id. at 326. The author explained:
On these frontiers, judges are far more likely to embrace jurisdiction if the plaintiff
seems to be saying something that the judge understands, somehow, as his own. If the
potential litigant "stands" on ground with which the judge is familiar, or if he states his
objection in a way ajudge can imagine uttering herself, the chances are understandably
improved that the judge will determine that the claimed harm is actually a legally cogni-
zable injury.
Id.
168 See id. at 332. He further observed:
[S]tanding rulings are often no more enlightening than a simple declaration that "we
choose to hear this case" and "we choose not to hear that one."
For the judges, of course, this is clear luxury. Imagine how much more difficult the
judicial task would be if the Justices felt compelled to offer a theory explaining why some
shared and intangible claims are heard and others rejected, why some subjective inter-
ests are judicially enforceable and others are not, why some litigants' worries constitute
injuries and others are mere speculations, or why some constitutional interests give rise
to lawsuits and others don't.
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Critics have long argued that the standing doctrine has led to in-
consistent decisions by the Court.169 Apparently, the justices would
agree because they have stated:
We need not mince words when we say that the concept of "Art. III stand-
ing" has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various
cases decided by this Court which have discussed it, nor when we say that
this very fact is probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a
one-sentence or one-paragraph definition. 70
If consistent decisions are not made, it is difficult for plaintiffs to
know how to argue that they have standing. It makes it easy, however,
for the justices to make decisions based on discretion. Some would
argue that there is in fact no standing doctrine at all. 17 1 Critics have
argued that the justices prefer it that way. 172 Nonetheless, in deter-
mining that Mendez-Thompson was correctly granted standing, analy-
sis of the standing doctrine is necessary, as it is what the Court will use
in making its decision.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
As the Eighth Circuit stated, "The political activities in which the
plaintiff wishes to engage fall within the very heart of the interests
protected by the First Amendment.', 173 Because the First Amendment
protects long-standing, fundamental freedoms provided to citizens of
169 Id. Nichol noted:
Some intangible claims are entertained, others rejected. Some group interests easily pass
muster, others are dismissed out of hand. Distinctions that would prove laughable in
most arenas are repeatedly embraced. Lines are drawn that can't be sustained, or even
understood. Positions described as crucial to the effective operation of democratic gov-
ernment one week, are ignored the next.
... It is, no doubt, the United States Supreme Court's particular province to "say
what the law is." The standing doctrine, however, is an extremely poor example of its
handiwork.
Id. at 304, 322 (footnote omitted); see also Laveta Casdorph, The Constitution and Reconstitution of
the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 471, 481 (1999) ("Specifically, critics contend that the
dramatic shifts in underlying doctrinal standards during differing eras, as well as arbitrary deci-
sions to apply one doctrine versus another, evidences the judiciary's discretionary policy prefer-
ences rather than Article III limits.").
170 Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for the Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
171 Nichol, supra note 8, at 315-16. Nichol explained:
So, in fact, the Supreme Court's mantra of injury, causation, and redressability
means very little in operation .... The sophisticated federal courts lawyer can add no
more than: "the judges are generous in these kinds of cases and skeptical in others."
The same rules do not apply across the board. They are, then, not rules after all.
Id.
72 Nichol, supra note 162, at 658 ("It may well be, however, that the Supreme Court has no
desire to make sense of the standing doctrine. As the doctrine presently exists, standing can
apparently be either rolled out or ignored in order to serve unstated and unexamined values.").
Firefighters II, 283 F.3d 969, 973 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
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the United States, it deserves special consideration when determining
whether or not a plaintiff has standing.17 As one commentator notes:
[I] n contrast to the protections of freedom of speech and freedom of the
press contained in many other constitutions and in national legal systems
where such liberties are implicit without textual designation, ours is a
structure in which freedom of expression is the norm, or at least the pre-
175sumption, and the denial of protection is the exception.
There are many rationales for the modem Court's strong protec-
don for freedom of political speech. In Whitney v. California, Justice
Brandeis's concurrence outlined several of those rationales. One key
rationale is that people should be allowed to develop their own per-
sonalities, in order to enable decisions to be made by a democratic
deliberative process rather than by the arbitrary exercise of author-
ity.' 77 Freedom of speech also advances the pursuit of truth by allow-
ing all opinions to be disseminated to the citizens. 7 8 Similarly, free-
dom of speech provides an avenue for dissent, which preserves social
stability. By fostering gradual societal change and by allowing every-
one to express their views, whether dissenting from the majority or
not, free s eech may actually promote stability and help to prevent
revolution.
In deciding whether or not to grant standing to Mendez-
Thompson, the Eighth Circuit appropriately placed special emphasis
on the chilling effect the ordinance had in preventing her political
speech. The First Amendment's right to freedom of political speech
is a crucial tool that was put in place by the founders of our country.
If someone such as Mendez-Thompson, whose political speech rights
are so clearly chilled, is not granted standing, the courts are not
showing enough concern for this foundational value of the govern-
ment.
174 See ROBERT M. ONEIL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CML LIABILITY 4 (2001) ("Our First
Amendment is by far the oldest and most durable of the world's guarantees of free expression.
It has been in existence for nearly 210 years in precisely its current form.").
175 Id. at 7.
176 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
177 See id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, [the Founders] eschewed silence coerced by law-the argument of
force in its worst form.").
178 See id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("[The Founders] believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile .... ")
179 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970) ("Freedom of
expression thus provides a framework in which the conflict necessary to the progress of a society
can take place without destroying the society."); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601,
620 (1973) (Douglas,J., dissenting) ("First Amendment rights are indeed fundamental, for 'we
the people' are the sovereigns, not those who sit in the seats of the mighty.").
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A. Standing and the First Amendment Chill
A person's claims that his or her First Amendment freedom of
speech rights have been injured should be adequate for standing
purposes, as long as that person has suffered from a particular harm
due to the loss of First Amendment rights. The Court appears to
agree:
The explanation for the Constitution's special concern with threats to
the right of citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery. The
First Amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people." "[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-
expression; it is the essence of self-government." Accordingly, the Court
has frequently reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the
"highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values," and is enti-
tled to special protection.' 80
Protection of political speech is one of the most important rights
the Constitution provides to citizens of the United States. Because
freedom of speech occupies "the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values," the prohibition against Mendez-
Thompson's political speech should at least provide her standing.
The courts then can decide whether the ordinance preventing her
political speech is invalid with respect to her.
A restriction on free speech does not have to be direct for the
court to strike it down. "Government action may... deter someone
from engaging in First Amendment activity without actually prohibit-
ing it. This deterrence is a 'chilling effect.""'18 The Court has held
that constitutional violations may arise from "the deterrent, or 'chill-
ing,' effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct
prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights .... [11n
each of these cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power
was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature .... ",8
In Laird v. Tatum, the Court recognized that even government ac-
tions that have an indirect effect on First Amendment rights could be
challenged.8 3 However, the Court found that the plaintiffs suffered
only from a subjective chill, which differs from a "claim of specific
present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm."'8 The
difference is that a subjective chill, because it may or may not occur,
180 Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1982) (citations omitted).
11 Jonathan R. Siegel, Note, Chilling Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 905, 906
(1989).
182 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
183 Id. at 13-14.
184 Id. at 14.
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forces the court to hand down an advisory opinion rather than an ac-
tual adjudication.
The plaintiffs in Laird claimed their First Amendment rights were
chilled by the "mere existence, without more, of a governmental in-
vestigative and data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in
scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid
governmental purpose." 6  The plaintiffs did not meet Article III
standing requirements because they did not show that they suffered
from a specific injury or imminent injury caused by the existence of
the government's activities. 87 In contrast to the plaintiffs in Laird,
Mendez-Thompson has suffered more than a subjective chill, and in-
stead has a claim of a present objective harm-the direct and current
chill on her First Amendment political free speech rights8e She can
also claim a threat of specific future harm-the loss of her husband's
income.
The Supreme Court most recently adjudicated claims of "chilling
effects" in its decision in Meese v. Keene. 9 Keene, a member of the
California state senate, wished to exhibit films that had been labeled
"political propaganda" under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.'90
Because the senator was not an agent of a foreign government, the
statute did not apply to him directly. However, Keene believed that if
the films were labeled "political propaganda" he could not show
them, which violated his First Amendment right of free expression.9
The Court held that "[i]f Keene had merely alleged.., a chilling ef-
fect on the exercise of his First Amendment rights, he would not have
standing to seek invalidation of the statute. The Court found,
however, that Keene had suffered more than a "subjective chill" be-
cause he had established a threat of cognizable injury to his
185 Id.
186 Id. at 10; cf Laird, 408 U.S. at 26 (Douglas,J., dissenting) ("One need not wait to sue until
he loses his job or until his reputation is defamed. To withhold standing to sue until that time
arrives would in practical effect immunize from judicial scrutiny all surveillance activities,
regardless of their misuse and their deterrent effect.").
Cf Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314 (1974) (opinion in chambers)
(holding that plaintiffs had standing when they argued that government surveillance of the na-
tional convention for the Socialist Workers Party would dissuade some delegates from partici-
pating actively and would result in possible loss of employment for those who are identified as
attending).
188 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 619 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Public
discussion of local, state, national, and international affairs is grist for the First Amendment
mill. Our decisions emphasize that free debate, uninhibited discussion, robust and wide-open
controversy, a multitude of tongues, the pressure of ideas clear across the spectrum set the pat-
tern of First Amendment freedoms.").
189 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
190 Id. at 467-68.
191 Id.
192 d. at 473.
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reputation. This opinion continues to suggest that a claim of "sub-
jective chill" alone will not be a basis for standing, but adds that a
chilling effect on First Amendment rights combined with "specific
present harm or a threat of specific future harm" will be sufficient
grounds for standing.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has weighed in
on this subject as well. The court determined that a "[c]hilling effect
is cited as the reason why the governmental imposition is invalid
rather than as the harm which entitles the plaintiff to challenge it.'
9 4
Whether the plaintiff has standing, therefore rests on "how likely it is
that the government will attempt to use these provisions against
them-that is, on the threat of enforcement-and not on how much
the prospect of enforcement worries them.
According to Laird, in order to prove that Mendez-Thompson's
First Amendment rights have been chilled, there must be a credible
threat of enforcement and her fear of enforcement must be objec-
tively reasonable. 96 As noted by the Eighth Circuit, "certainty of in-
jury is not necessary, at least in the First Amendment context. She
should not be required to undertake a prohibited activity, and risk
the consequent economic loss, in order to test the validity of the
threatened application of the charter."0
97
Mendez-Thompson's fear of enforcement was objectively reason-
able for two reasons. First, the city of Ferguson did not answer her
lawyer's letter requesting information about how the provision
should be interpreted.9 8 Second, Mayor Wegert's answers during his
deposition indicate that had Mendez-Thompson taken the actions
she wanted to, he would have considered them a violation of the pro-
vision.'99 The Eighth Circuit correctly held that the chilling of her
First Amendment rights provided Mendez-Thompson with sufficient
injury for the court to grant her standing.
B. First Amendment and the Overbreadth Doctrine
There is another exception to the general rules governing third
party standing. This exception, called the overbreadth doctrine,
193 Id. (agreeing and quoting Keene's characterization that his "personal, political, and pro-
fessional reputation would suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to practice his profes-
sion would be impaired" if he exhibited films labeled "political propaganda").
194 Am. Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (alteration in original)
(quoting United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
195 Id.
196 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1972).
197 Firefighters II, 283 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1105 (2003).
198 Id. at 972.
199 See id. (indicating that Mayor Wegert felt that the placing of election signs and the making
of political contributions on the part of the family members would violate the provision).
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"reflects the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally pro-
tected expression. 2 0 0  The overbreadth doctrine is limited to First
Amendment cases. It stems from a fear that an overbroad law will
chill protected speech and that encouraging this type of expression
provides a sufficient basis for allowing third party standing.20 1 A party
has standing to challenge a statute because it is overbroad whether or
not his own conduct can be governed by it, because of the "danger of
tolerating, in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of
a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application."2 2
This doctrine thus recognizes the chilling effect of a statute as a basis
for third party standing. It would seem to make sense, therefore, that
the chilling effect should also be a basis for standing for the original
plaintiff.
203
A plaintiff must show that the law substantially punishes protected
free speech 'Judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep. Once this is proved, all enforcement of that law stops until
the law is narrowed.0" As discussed above, in order to have standing,
an individual still must meet the case or controversy requirements in
2M Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816 (1975); see also Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479,
486-87 (1965) ("Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we
have not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their
rights."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 867 (1991) ("Any
substantial 'chilling' of constitutionally protected expression is intolerable.").
20 See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980)
("In... First Amendment contexts, the courts are inclined to disregard the normal rule against
permitting one whose conduct may validly be prohibited to challenge the proscription as it ap-
plies to others because of the possibility that protected speech... may be inhibited by the
overly broad reach of the statute.").
202 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963); see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 114 (1972) ("Because overbroad laws, like vague ones, deter privileged activity, our cases
firmly establish appellant's standing to raise an overbreadth challenge."); Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518 (1972) (permitting appellant to challenge the unconstitutional overbreadth of a
statute as applied to others when the statute broadly limited protected speech); Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971)(reversing convictions of appellants convicted for violation
of an overbroad statute targeting "annoying" behavior); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. at 486
(allowing appellants to challenge a statute prohibiting subversive activities under which they
had been charged but not yet convicted); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (permitting
appellant to challenge statute restricting religious speech).
203 Siegel, supra note 181, at 920. Siegel noted:
Yet when the third party shows up in court himself as plaintiff and claims chilling injury,
the Supreme Court refuses to hear the case, and tells him that he is not even injured.
This anomaly should be eliminated: The party actually suffering chilling injury should
be allowed to plead his case himself.
Id.
204 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
20- See Virginia v. Hicks, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2003) ("We have provided this expansive rem-
edy out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 'chill' con-




Article III, with a "claim of specific present objective harm or a threat
of specific future harm."° 6
The overbreadth doctrine allows a party to overcome the normal
prudential consideration against third party standing, so that the
plaintiff is able to challenge the statute not because his own expres-
sion is chilled, but because the breadth of the statute means that
other persons' free expression is being chilled.
[I] n the First Amendment context, "' [1]itigants... are permitted to chal-
lenge a statute not because their own rights of free expression are vio-
lated, but because of ajudicial prediction or assumption that the statute's
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from con-
stitutionally protected speech or expression.'
20 7
The Court determines whether the plaintiff satisfies the case and
controversy requirement and whether it will frame the issues in the
case and argue zealously.
2 08
Mendez-Thompson was correctly granted standing so that the
courts may decide if the Ferguson ordinance is constitutional as ap-
plied to a nonpublic employee. However, even if the court decides
that the government can restrict Mendez-Thompson's speech,
Mendez-Thompson should be able to challenge the ordinance based
on its "sweeping and improper application. 2 0  Because of the "indi-
rect" language contained in this ordinance, all city employees, includ-
ing their families, might be prevented from exercising their essential
First Amendment freedom of speech rights. "Public discussion of lo-
cal, state, national, and international affairs is grist for the First
Amendment mill. Our decisions emphasize that free debate,
uninhibited discussion, robust and wide-open controversy, a
multitude of tongues, the pressure of ideas clear across the spectrum
set the pattern of First Amendment freedoms."M' The courts should
not be so quick to reject standing when rights that maintain the
fundamental freedoms of United States citizens are at the core of the
claim.
2W Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14 (1972).
207 Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (alteration in original) (cit-
ing Sec'y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57 (1984) (quoting Broadrick, 413
U.S. at 612)).
208 See Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. at 957 (asserting that the plaintiff is a satisfactory party
to challenge an overbroad statute).
20 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
210 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 619 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit correctly granted standing to Mendez-
Thompson in International Ass'n of Firefighters Local 2665 v. Ferguson.
She would potentially have suffered concrete economic injuries that
are stronger than many other injuries for which the Court has
granted standing. She also suffered from a chill on her First
Amendment freedom of speech rights.
When a claim is made that involves such fundamental freedoms as
First Amendment freedom of speech, the courts should make a
searching inquiry into the injury claimed under the standing doc-
trine. There have to be limits when a person has not suffered from
something that could at all be classified as an injury, either economi-
cally or under the First Amendment. However, when an ordinance
prohibits a person from expressing political speech, the courts should
not easily dismiss the claim for lack of standing due to indirect injury.
The Eighth Circuit was correct to grant Mendez-Thompson standing
in order to consider whether the Ferguson ordinance, as applied to a
nonpublic employee, was constitutionally improper.
The importance of the First Amendment issues affecting Mendez-
Thompson underscore the need to grant her standing. Admittedly,
the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit may increase the caseload
of the federal courts. However, these types of concerns should not
prevent the courts from hearing cases that present important First
Amendment claims. It is particularly important that the Supreme
Court grant certiorari in a case similar to Firefighters to establish that
plaintiffs in the situation of Mendez-Thompson deserve standing.
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